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SUMMARY
Companies’ aggressiveness in financial reporting,
and the role of auditors in constraining this, are
important contemporary topics (Levitt, 1998; 
APB, 2001). Very few studies, however, examine
the process of negotiation between auditors and
directors. Although generic negotiation models
capture many aspects of this process (e.g.,
exchange of information, appeal to norms,
strategies and tactics adopted), such models (e.g.,
Gulliver, 1979) are under-theorised given the
complexity of the auditor-client relationship and
require further development. To date, the only
behavioural study to adopt a qualitative, case
study based approach using real audit negotiations
is Beattie et al. (2001), reported in a book titled
Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really
About. A grounded theory model of the negotiation
process was developed and the purpose of this
paper is to summarise the findings of that study,
making it accessible through the scholarly journal
literature.
Matched interviews were conducted with 
the finance directors (FDs) and audit engagement
partners (AEPs) of six major UK listed companies
who had recently engaged in significant
discussions and negotiations. Interviewees were
asked to ‘tell the story’ of these interactions. The
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analytical procedures followed enable concepts to
be identified and grouped into categories. The
interaction itself is the core category of the
grounded theory analysis. It is a process involving
events, strategies, outcome and consequences. The
nature of the interaction is influenced by the specific
context of the interaction: the issue, the objectives
of the individual parties, key third parties and
other factors. This specific context in turn
moderates powerful general contextual factors: 
the quality of the primary relationship, company
circumstances, audit firm circumstances and
company buyer type. The external economic and
regulatory setting has a significant but more
peripheral impact.
The primary contextual factors affecting the
strategy adopted by each party and the nature of
the outcome appeared to be general, rather than
specific. High AEP integrity ensured an outcome
quality above a certain threshold, although the
ease of agreement depended upon other factors. 
A quality hierarchy of six seller types is
hypothesised. The quality of the primary
relationship impacted directly upon both the
quality of the outcome and the ease of agreement.
Other critical general factors were: company type
and situation (e.g., conservative or aggressive, the
possibility of a bid); the effectiveness of corporate
governance arrangements in the company (e.g.,
powerful, dominant chairman); the clarity of the
accounting rules relating to the interaction issue;
and the support and quality control procedures 
of the audit firm. The strategy adopted by the 
AEP was an intervening variable: assertiveness,
reasoning, coalition and sanction strategies were
associated with good outcomes and ingratiation
and conditional acceptance were associated with
poor outcomes.
A secondary outcome of the study was the
identification of a hierarchy of six seller types (i.e.
AEP types) to complement the taxonomy of buyer
types that already exists in the literature. This
taxonomy reflects an AEP’s level of professional
and personal integrity, their level of technical
competence and other personal characteristics
(such as predisposition towards self-reliance,
confrontation and scepticism).
INTRODUCTION
Companies’ aggressiveness in financial reporting
is an important contemporary topic. In a now
famous speech titled The Numbers Game, a former
Chairman of the SEC lambasted companies for
manipulating accounting numbers and thereby
eroding the quality of financial reporting (Levitt,
1998). The fundamental importance of this issue
has, since the Enron affair, become more widely
recognised. Debate has focused upon the general
regulatory environment and factors specific to the
auditor-client relationship (i.e. client company,
audit firm and individual auditor factors).
The general regulatory environment reflects the
particular regulatory control strategy adopted, a
choice often characterised as the ‘principles versus
rules’ debate. ‘Formalism’ implies a narrow
approach to control, that is, the use of clearly
defined, highly administrable rules, which carries
the danger of ‘creative compliance’ (i.e. the use of
rules to escape control without actually violating
those rules). An anti-formalism strategy involves
stressing the overriding purpose of financial
accounting in terms of the true and fair view
override (in the UK), the use of broad criteria and
the avoidance of tight definitions. It can be
criticised on the grounds of legitimacy (it being
argued that citizens have the right to know exactly
what is prohibited in advance of behaviour),
imprecision, and the possibility of outrageous
results (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991; 1992).1
McBarnet & Whelan (1999) conclude that
controlling creative accounting ultimately depends
on instilling a business ethic of compliance within
the spirit of the law.
The auditor-client relationship dimension of 
the debate on aggressive financial reporting is
extremely complex. A key question is ‘How do
companies and their auditors resolve important
audit issues?’. In particular, what role do auditors
play in preventing overly aggressive financial
reporting? In the UK, the Auditing Practices Board
has issued a consultation paper that encourages
auditors to be more alert and responsive to the 
risk of aggressive earnings management (APB,
2001). Specifically, auditors are encouraged to
understand better the pressures on directors and
management to deliver a specific level of earnings;
to act with even greater scepticism; to place greater
emphasis on the broader factors influencing
materiality; to take a more robust attitude with
directors; and to communicate openly and frankly
with those charged with governance.
The audit firm-client company relationship
(hereafter auditor-client relationship) has certain
distinguishing features. The audit team must
interact with the employees and management of
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the client company, obtaining information and
explanations, with a view to preparing an audit
report for the company’s shareholders. Added to
this, senior company management have de facto
control over the appointment and remuneration 
of the auditor. A company’s audited financial
statements emerge from the interactions that take
place between, primarily, the finance director and
the audit engagement partner. These interactions
can involve conflict, which leads in turn to
negotiations and perhaps bargaining.
Many empirical academic studies have
investigated the factors that influence (or are
perceived to influence) an auditor’s ability to resist
management pressure (e.g., Knapp, 1985; Gul,
1989; Beattie et al., 1999) and auditors’ response 
to ethical dilemmas (e.g., Lord & DeZoort, 2001;
Shafer et al., 1999, 2001; Thorne & Hartwick, 
2001). These studies use large-scale survey or
experimental methods. However, very few studies
examine the process of negotiation and (due to
access problems) virtually none uses evidence
drawn from real situations. It is only in recent years
that a new strand of empirical behavioural
research has emerged that possesses one or other
or both of these desirable characteristics (Gibbins
et al., 2001; Beattie et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2002).
To date, however, the only behavioural study to
adopt a qualitative, case study based approach
using real negotiations has been Beattie et al. (2001).
Matched, in-depth interviews were conducted
with the audit partners and finance directors of 
six major UK listed companies who had recently
experienced audit interactions involving
significant accounting issues. A grounded theory
model was developed of the negotiation process
and the factors that influenced the nature of the
outcome of interactions. The study is reported in a
book titled Behind Closed Doors: What Company
Audit is Really About. Within this book, a chapter is
devoted to presenting the interview evidence from
each of the six case studies, and the process of
development of the grounded theory is set out in
detail. This permits the ‘huge chasm’ that often
separates data from conclusions to be bridged
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 539).
In this paper, the grounded theory model of the
auditor-client negotiation process that emerged
from the case study analysis is presented. This
makes the findings accessible through the journal
literature. In writing this summary paper, the
opportunity is taken to update the review of
related literature.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. The next section, a review of relevant
literature, begins by examining negotiation,
conflict and strategies in non-audit settings. It then
reviews the limited prior and contemporaneous
literature in audit settings that either examines the
process of negotiation or collects real-life data on
actual negotiations. Methods are briefly outlined in
the third section. The fourth section of the paper
presents the grounded theory model of auditor-
client interactions. A final section summarises and
concludes.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
Negotiation, conflict and strategies in 
non-audit settings
The generic process of negotiation (and related
concepts) has been the subject of detailed analysis
in the social sciences. ‘Negotiation’ is defined as
‘processes of interaction between disputing 
parties whereby, without compulsion by a third-
party adjudicator, they endeavour to come to 
an interdependent, joint decision concerning the
terms of agreement on the issues between them’
(Gulliver, 1979, p. 79, emphasis in original).
Negotiation encompasses ‘bargaining’, which
‘consists of the presentation and exchange of 
more or less specific proposals for the terms 
of agreement on particular issues’ (Gulliver, 
1979, p. 71).
The problem faced by negotiators is that of
‘being interdependent while having interests
which are in contrast to those of the other 
party’ (Mastenbroek, 1989, p. 56). In addition,
‘negotiating presumes a certain symmetry in the
balance of power’ (Mastenbroek, 1989, p. 63).
‘Power’ can be defined as ‘the ability of one actor
to overcome resistance in achieving a desired
result’ (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). ‘Conflict’ can 
be defined as ‘the interaction of interdependent
people who perceive the opposition of goals, aims,
and/or values, and who see the other party as
potentially interfering with the realization of 
these goals (aims, or values)’ (quoted in Nicotera,
1993).
Gulliver (1979) develops, from actual cases
spanning a wide range of contexts, an analytical
framework that captures the economic, social, and
psychological aspects of the negotiation process. It
is a non-game model that recognises two general
processes in negotiation that create and sustain 
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the internal dynamics: a cyclical process and a
developmental process.
The cyclical process involves the ongoing
exchange of information between the parties
(perhaps incorporating information from third
parties). The kind of information exchanged
depends on the current phase of negotiation, and
may include information about procedural rules,
appeals to norms, factual information, threats and
promises. When a party receives information, they
assess it, adjust their own preference set and their
expectations of the other party, and revise their
overall strategy. They then make a tactical decision
about what information to pass to the other party.
Typical tactics are: to concentrate on obtaining
further information; to change the subject matter of
the information exchange when a current issue
seems threatening; to focus on the affective tone of
the relationship; to match the behaviour of the
other party, for example offer antagonism for
antagonism; to offer opposing behaviour to that of
the other party; and to make concessions.
The developmental process occurs through
successive iterations of this cycle, as they drive the
negotiation through a number of overlapping
phases. The causes of convergence and the nature
of the outcome can often be explained in terms of
appeals to norms and other sources of power. It is
the conversion of potential power into effective
persuasive strength (not actual power) which is
important.
Negotiation strategies and tactics are examined
by Kipnis et al. (1980), who undertake an empirical
study of managerial use of influence within
organisations. They first asked managers to
describe actual incidents and from this constructed
a questionnaire containing 58 influence tactics.
Responses to this questionnaire were factor
analysed to reveal seven dimensions of influence.
Kipnis & Schmidt (1982) developed a new scale to
measure these seven influence strategies: reason
– the use of facts and data to support the
development of a logical argument; coalition – the
mobilisation of other people in the organisation;
ingratiation – the use of impression management,
flattery and the creation of goodwill; bargaining –
the use of negotiation through the exchange of
benefits or favours; assertiveness – the use of a direct
and forceful approach; higher authority – gaining
the support of higher levels in the organisation 
to back up requests; and sanctions – the use 
of organisationally derived rewards and
punishments.
Negotiation in audit settings
Analytical models of auditor-client bargaining
have tended to be abstract, economic, game-
theoretic models (e.g., Fellingham & Newman,
1985; Zhang, 1999). Over a decade ago, Murnighan
& Bazerman (1990) argued that more behavioural
research was needed if we were to further our
understanding of negotiation behaviour. Despite
this plea, limited work of this nature has been
undertaken.
Other, non-analytical models have been
developed. Kleinman & Palmon (2001) focus
broadly on auditor-client relationships, with a
particular emphasis on auditor independence.
They synthesise extant research on auditor-client
relationships and use this platform, together with
established theories from the field of social
psychology, to construct a multi-level model of
these relationships. The levels considered are 
those of the individual, the audit firm (together
comprising the micro model) and the wider
environment (the macro model). The linkages
between the different elements of the model and
between the micro and macro levels are not really
addressed and, as a result, the model is essentially
a synthesising framework. Recognising some of
these limitations, the authors call for more
qualitative, case study research of auditor
behaviour (p. 135).
Gibbins & Salterio (2001) develop a cognitive
model of the auditor’s intended strategy in
auditor-client negotiations. They identify, from 
the generic bargaining literature, two principal
strategies – distributive and integrative. Each has
an associated range of tactics. Distributive tactics
include concession-making and contending, while
integrative tactics include creative problem solving
and expanding the agenda. Three principal factors
influencing intended bargaining strategy are
defined: individual issue assessment, auditor
motivation and auditor relative bargaining power.
Each is presented, for simplicity of exposition, as a
dichotomy: overlap/non-overlap between auditor
and client acceptable ranges; toward-auditor-
favoured outcomes versus toward-client-favoured
outcomes; strong versus weak, respectively.
Assuming cognitive economy (i.e., a simple
strategy is preferred to a complex one) and
manipulating auditor motivation and bargaining
power factors, predictions are made regarding 
the general strategy and specific tactics that will 
be employed.
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Two quantitative, questionnaire studies of
interactions and negotiations have been
undertaken. Gibbins et al. (2001) survey ninety-
three experienced Canadian public accounting
firm partners, who were asked to respond in 
the context of a specific negotiation example
selected from their experience. They find that
agreement was reported to have been reached
somewhere between both parties’ original
positions in 41% of cases, on the auditor’s original
position in 32% of cases, and on the client’s 
original position in 4% of cases. A new solution
was generated in 16% of cases. The two factors said 
to be of most importance to the negotiation 
were ‘accounting and disclosure standards’ 
and ‘audit firms’ accounting expertise’. They
conclude that negotiation is important, frequent
and context-sensitive. Client perceptions were 
not surveyed and so no comparison can be made
between the responses of the different parties. 
The questionnaire is structured using a three-
element accounting negotiation process model
based on the behavioural negotiation literature and
elaborated to include accounting contextual
features.
Beattie et al. (2000) survey 300 listed UK
company finance directors and 307 listed company
audit engagement partners (response rates were
51% and 80%, respectively). This survey
established the frequency with which, over a three-
year period, an extensive set of 46 audit and audit-
related issues was discussed, was negotiated, and
resulted in a change to either the accounting
numbers or disclosures. This large-scale survey
allows the extent, nature and outcome of
interactions to be assessed for the population 
as a whole. Compliance issues are found to
dominate discussions, while accounting and fee
issues dominate negotiations. In aggregate,
auditor/auditee interactions have a significant
impact upon the content of financial reports, the
mean number of reported changes to the
accounting numbers (disclosures) being 1.3 (2.9)
and 3.4 (6.1) for the FD and AEP groups,
respectively.
In response to an open-ended question
regarding the factors influencing the outcome of
interactions, respondents referred to:
• the client’s general attitude, in particular their
wish to ‘stick to the rules’;
• the need for compromise, that is, to balance
technical accounting considerations with
commercial considerations;
• the influence of third parties, in particular audit
firm technical departments and client audit
committees;
• fear of referral to the Financial Reporting
Review Panel (FRRP), the UK monitoring and
enforcement body;
• the threat of audit qualification; and
• the quality of the auditor’s argument in
support of their position.
Goodwin (2002) uses an experimental approach 
to explore the conflict management styles used 
by auditors when resolving disputes with 
clients concerning financial statement issues. She
adopts Rahim’s (1983) generic model of 
conflict management styles, which is based on 
two dimensions: concern for self and concern for
others. From these two dimensions, five distinct
styles emerge: integrating (high concern for self
and others); dominating (high concern for self and
low concern for others); obliging (low concern for
self and high concern for others); avoiding (low
concern for self and others); and compromising
(intermediate in concern for self and others).
Seventy-two audit partners and audit managers
from Australia and New Zealand took part, 
based on a scenario involving possible inventory
obsolescence. It was found that the integrating
style was used most frequently, followed by
compromising and dominating styles. The size of
the client and the strength of corporate governance
mechanisms in place had a significant but
relatively minor impact on the choice of styles.
To date, therefore, the only behavioural study to
adopt a qualitative, case study based approach
using real negotiations is the one summarised in
the present paper.
METHODS
Case selection and conduct of interviews
The six cases were identified from the Beattie et al.
(2000) questionnaire study. Respondents were
asked whether they were willing to be interviewed
to enable us to explore with them, in greater depth,
the responses that they had made, and six finance
directors (FDs) who indicated high levels of
negotiation and discussion were approached for
interview and all agreed. The recommended
optimum number of cases in analysis of this type
is four to ten (Eisenhardt, 1989). An effort was
made to select companies representing a range of
company sizes, industry sectors and audit firms
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). Written assurances were given
that neither the interviewee nor the company
would be identified or identifiable in any
subsequent publication.
Before the interviews took place, the company’s
annual reports for the period covered by the
questionnaire were studied as a familiarisation
exercise. No standard interview guidelines or
questions were developed as each case was
different. Instead, FDs were asked to ‘tell the story’,
from their perspective, of the discussions and
negotiations with their auditors referred to in their
questionnaire responses, and encouraged to raise
any other issues they wanted to (Thompson, 
1988). The interviewer employed both neutral,
conversational prompts and a laddering technique.
This technique requires that the interviewer keeps
asking ‘why?’, working backwards to antecedent
conditions and forwards to anticipated effects
(Brown, 1992, p. 293). Where necessary, subsidiary
prompts used were:
• who got involved in the various stages of the
interaction (e.g., FD, audit committee, main
board)?
• what was the role of the audit committee?
• were negotiations conducted informally or at
formal meetings?
• what information was exchanged?
• how did the information you received alter
your preferences, your expectations of the other
party, your strategy (if at all)?
• were any threats or promises made?
• what was the tone of the exchanges?
• were you happy with the outcome?
At the close of each interview, the FD was asked
for permission to interview the audit engagement
partner (AEP) with whom the discussions and
negotiations had taken place.2,3 All the FDs
interviewed gave their consent, and in all cases the
key contact was the audit firm’s designated AEP,
confirming that this was the primary relationship.
In one case, however, the condition was that the 
FD also wanted to be present. We asked the
interviewee to effect an introduction to the AEP,
before contacting the AEP direct and conducting a
similar interview with him.
Each AEP was asked to ‘tell the story’ from his
perspective about the issues which had been
discussed with his client and was also encouraged
to add any other information he considered
relevant. We were very careful not to give any
indications to the AEPs of what the FDs had
actually said about any of the issues. Eleven
interviews were recorded and fully transcribed.
Extensive notes were taken at the remaining
interview and dictated immediately afterwards.
Analytical procedures
Analysis of the transcribed interviews was
undertaken using grounded theory procedures
and techniques (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
Grounded theory is the process of building theory
inductively by means of the qualitative analysis 
of data. General theories of negotiation, such 
as Gulliver’s framework, may have some
applicability to the audit setting. There are,
however, important specific circumstances
associated with the audit context that suggest that
any general framework will be conceptually
underdeveloped and will need special adaptation
and extension.4
Following a preliminary review of the
transcripts, it was decided to adopt a four-stage
process: telling the story of each case; within-case
analysis; cross-case analysis; and building theory
from cross-case analysis. By means of an iterative
process, the key events and issues referred to by
the interviewees in each case were identified and
written up as a chronological story that reflected
the differing perspectives of both interviewees on
the issues (Hansen & Kahnweiler, 1993).5,6
The analytical stages involved coding of three
types. During early ‘open’ coding, conducted
during within-case analysis, concepts were
identified, labelled and categorised. Concepts, the
basic unit of analysis in grounded theory, are
names that represent a phenomenon and therefore
can be used at a higher level of generality than 
the raw data. Concepts were identified by asking
questions of the raw data and by comparing
phenomena so that like phenomena were given the
same name. Once concepts began to emerge from
this coding, concepts that appeared to relate to the
same phenomenon were grouped together, thus
forming categories. These categories were also
labelled, using higher-level names than those of
the concepts grouped under it. To identify and
understand the relationships between categories in
the later stages of analysis, it was necessary to
establish the attributes of the categories (i.e., their
properties) and also the dimensions of these
properties.
Whereas open coding focused on the breaking
down of data, the second type of coding, axial
coding, focused on putting the data back together
6 V. Beattie et al.
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again in a different way, by making connections
between each category and its sub-categories. This
process allowed categories to be developed beyond
their properties and dimensions. Elements of this
type of coding inevitably creep into open coding,
for as the data is broken apart it is natural to begin
to put it back together in a relational form. The
third and final type of coding, selective coding,
concerns the final theory development phase 
of analysis. It involved the selection of a core
category, followed by a process of systematically
relating all other categories to it at a high level of
generality.
During preliminary within-case analysis, labels
were attached to the three broad key concepts
contained in each case: context, interactions and
outcomes. At an early stage, we identified four
contextual factors that we thought might influence
the nature and outcome of the interactions. These
were: company size; the quality of the primary
relationship between the FD and the AEP (graded
from poor to very good); the existence of an audit
committee; and the company reporting style
(graded from aggressive to very conservative).7
Financial reporting interactions were classified 
in two ways: (i) compliance versus judgement; 
and (ii) whether recognition, measurement,
classification in a primary statement, disclosure or
fundamental accounting principle. Outcomes were
graded from good to poor.
During detailed within-case analyses, the general
contextual factors that appeared to influence the
nature and outcome of all the interactions were
identified for each case. Each interaction was 
then analysed separately and appropriate labels
attached to its type and outcome. The specific
contextual factors that appeared to influence 
the interaction were then identified. This within-
case analysis led to the identification of concepts,
categories, sub-categories and relationships
specific to the interactions occurring in a single
case setting.
As the data was read and reread, all three types
of coding took place, although open coding
dominated early within-case coding sessions 
while axial and selective coding dominated later
sessions. Moreover, all early coding was viewed as
provisional, as concepts and categories evolved
and changed as new data was read and compared.
Many iterations were required before a stable 
set of concepts and categories emerged. During
coding, notes were written containing the products
of the three types of coding, such as concept labels,
sub-categories and relationships. Diagrams that
visually represent the relationships between
concepts and categories were particularly useful.
These were modified continuously as the analysis
of the data progressed and new insights emerged.
RESULTS
In this paper, only the results of the cross-case
analysis and the grounded theory model are
presented. The separate within-case analyses can
be found in Beattie et al. (2001, chs. 5–10).
Overview of principal analytical categories
The core category (the central phenomenon) was
the interaction itself. The other principal categories
represent a set of conditional features bearing upon
the core interaction, with some category groups
being quite distant to the interaction and others
very close to it. These groups are shown in Figure
1 as a series of embedded rectangles.8
At the outermost level, reflecting the weakest
and most indirect influence on the interaction, lies
the global regulatory climate. This category refers
to the tone of pronouncements and policies on
accounting and auditing emanating from the SEC
in the US and the EC. Although none of our
interviewees specifically mentioned these bodies,
the global regulatory position influences the
national regulatory position and most of the
interviewees would be aware of this link. Most of
the case companies had overseas operations.
Next closest to the periphery lies the external
national climate, encompassing the external
trading environment (economic growth, interest
rates, exchange rates) and the national regulatory
climate. The influence of the regulatory bodies 
in particular were mentioned by interviewees – 
the impact of the ASB in curtailing aggressive
accounting practices; the desire not to be
investigated by the FRRP; and the need to comply
with the UK’s corporate governance requirements.
Moving one level further towards the core, we
come to the general context of the company and 
the audit firm. This context impacts upon all
interactions between these two parties. There are
four distinct categories to consider here: the quality
of the primary relationship; the company
circumstances; the audit firm circumstances; and
the company buyer type.
Closest to the core comes the specific context 
of the interaction. This concerns features of the
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interaction that vary from interaction to
interaction, moderating the general contextual
factors. We identified four distinct categories: the
interaction issue; the objectives of the individual
parties; the key third parties; and other factors.
Finally, there is the core category, i.e., the
interaction itself. We identified four categories
involved in the sequence of related actions: events,
strategies, outcome and consequences.
Concepts, properties and dimensions
associated with principal 
analytical categories
From the separate within-case analyses, the
concepts, properties and dimensions associated
with the principal analytical categories were
identified. These are set out in detail in Table 1. In
many cases, the concepts related to a category are,
to a greater or lesser extent, interdependent. The
text offers some additional observations relating to
the quality of the primary relationship, company
circumstances, and interaction events, strategies
and outcomes.
Looking first at the quality of the primary
relationship, two concepts appeared to have a
negative influence – age gap and FD’s previous
employment with audit firm in a position senior 
to AEP. While the professional integrity of the two
individuals (especially the AEP) impacted very
directly on the interaction, it also appeared that the
level of professional integrity of one relative to 
the other influenced the interaction indirectly
through its impact on the quality of the primary
relationship.
Many of the salient company circumstances
were also audit risk factors. The latter were of 
two general types, those related to the corporate
culture and those related to the company’s current
financial and trading circumstances. Buyer type 
is a culture-related factor. Four distinct buyer 
types of audit services were identified by Beattie 
& Fearnley (1998), based on survey evidence:
grudger, comfort-seeker, resource-seeker and
status-seeker. Essentially, buyer type is determined
by the board’s attitude to five issues: the overall
value of the audit and the importance of 
four general auditor characteristics (integrity/
competence/reputation of auditor; auditor’s
acceptability to third parties; quality of working
relationships with auditor; and non-audit services
provided by auditor). Buyer type is associated with
both company reporting style and the professional
integrity of the FD.
8 V. Beattie et al.
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Global regulatory climate 
∑ SEC 
∑ EC
External national climate 
External national climate 
∑ External trading 
      environment 
∑ Regulatory climate
General company/audit firm context 
∑ Quality of primary relationship 
∑ Company circumstances
∑ Firm circumstances
∑ Company buyer type
Specific context 
∑ Issue 
∑ Objectives
∑ Key third parties 
∑ Other 
Interaction 
(core category) 
∑ Events
∑ Strategies
∑ Outcome 
∑ Consequences
Figure 1: Principal Analytical Categories
Source: Figure 12.1 in Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About, Beattie et al. (2001), Palgrave.
Reproduced with permission.
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Table 1: Principal Categories and their Concepts, Properties and Dimensions
Category Concepts Properties and dimensions
Quality of primary Mutual objectives Very poor–very good
relationship Mutual trust and respect
Compatible personalities
Experience/competence
Level of professional integrity of FD 
relative to AEP
Age gap
FD’s previous employment with audit 
firm in a position senior to AEP
Length of relationship
Company Size of company Importance of company to client
circumstances Buyer type: portfolio
• grudger
• comfort-seeker
• resource-seeker
• status-seeker
Ownership structure Audit risk of client
Company reporting style, i.e., board 
attitude to:
• matters of fact (compliance culture)
• matters of judgement 
(aggressive vs. conservative)
Professional integrity of FD
Effectiveness of audit committee
Financial position (healthy/in difficulties)
Growth position (expansion/contraction)
Bid risk/possibility of sale
Level of technical accounting expertise Level of technical support required
within company
Firm Support and monitoring infrastructure Structures, procedures, schemes
circumstances Partner incentives
Professional integrity of AEP Low–high
Personal integrity of AEP
Interaction issue Fundamental principle Fact vs. judgement
Recognition One-off vs. continuing
Measurement/valuation Visible vs. not visible
Classification in a primary statement Materiality
Disclosure
Objectives of Desire to minimise effect and/or visibility —
individual of issue
parties Earnings management
Revenge
Face-saving:
– own
– another individual
– organisation
Secrecy
Keep out of trouble
Avoid escalation
Avoid confrontation
Key third parties Chairman Affiliation: company, audit firm,
Individual non-executive director external;
CEO Influence: direct or indirect via
Board of directors primary party
Audit committee Active involvement vs. passive
Senior management (not main board level) influence
10 V. Beattie et al.
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Table 1: Continued
Category Concepts Properties and dimensions
Second partner Nature of involvement:
Technical partner • provide information or
Technical department opinions/assurance
Regulator • be informed
Specialist advisor • give approval/agreement
Shareholders • participate in negotiation
Analysts • take action
Lenders
Other specific Party raising issue: —
contextual – FD
factors – AEP
– both
Agreement between primary parties that 
issue needs to be addressed
Negotiation conducted under time 
pressure/reporting deadlines
History of issue, i.e., need to take a tougher 
stance due to:
– regulatory climate
– new evidence
– change in company risk profile
Impact of other current interactions
Impact on future accounting periods
Interaction events Provision of information by auditor —
Primary party seeks advice/opinion of 
third party
Withholding of information from third parties
Search for solution to avoid an undesirable 
outcome for company (e.g., reduce visibility)/
assessment of alternative outcomes
Change of position
Acknowledgement of mistake
Interaction State position very firmly Assertiveness —
strategies at outset
Tender/auditor change Sanction
threat made
Escalate or threaten to Sanction
escalate negotiation by 
involving additional 
parties
Qualification or threat Sanction
of qualification made 
Take blame (to achieve Ingratiation
desired outcome)
Use evidence to support Reason
argument
Use reasoned argument Reason
Willingness to Bargaining
compromise
Strategic give and take Bargaining
across issues
Agreed strategy for Coalesce
handling third parties 
Get third party on side to Coalesce
secure agreement 
The position of the FD may, of course, not be 
in tune with that of the board as a whole (in 
reality, the company position tends to be the view
held by key, dominant board members such as the
chairman). The two buyer types that are
incompatible between the FD and the board are
that of grudger and comfort-seeker. It is unlikely
that the FD will be a grudger if the company is a
comfort-seeker, as it is in the FD’s interests to adopt
the company position unless it compromises 
his professional integrity. It is more likely that the
FD will be by nature a comfort-seeker while the
company is a grudger. This is a very difficult
position for the FD as he will always be at risk of
compromising his professional integrity in order to
satisfy the demands of his employer.
Interaction events, which occur during an
interaction, can be distinguished from interaction
strategies, which are plans. Of course, the two
categories are closely related, as the adoption of 
a strategy often gives rise to events, but not
necessarily those planned. The particular mix of
strategies used determined certain properties 
of the interactions, in particular, the number of
parties involved, the number of stages, and the
level of escalation. The interaction strategy concept
‘willingness to compromise’ had two distinct
forms. The compromise could take place either
within the accounting rules or outside the rules.
Of primary interest to external parties is the
quality of the financial reporting outcome, that is,
does the outcome reflect ‘good’ or ‘bad’ accounting
from a public interest perspective? In addition, 
for the parties involved directly in the interaction,
the ease with which the agreed outcome is 
reached is important. For a given outcome, it is
rational for an individual to prefer an easy
interaction to a difficult one. This outcome
dimension is also a continuous variable. It captures
issues like number of parties involved, number of
stages, and the extent to which strategies were
used that undermine ongoing relationships. These
two dimensions of outcome (quality and ease of
agreement) can be perceived as capturing the
effectiveness and efficiency of the audit,
respectively.
Grounded theory of interaction outcomes
Developing a grounded theory of auditor-
client negotiations requires an understanding of
the process of interaction. The key linkages are
between context, strategy and outcome. Each of 
the 22 significant accounting issues analysed 
was reviewed to identify the critical contextual
factors, the strategies adopted and the dimensions
of the outcome. The results are shown in Table 
2.
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Table 1: Continued
Category Concepts Properties and dimensions
Seek confirmation and Higher authority
authority:
– for own position
– for other party’s 
position
Apply conditions to Conditions
acceptance of other 
party’s position
Interaction — Quality of accounting: poor/not
outcome compliant – good/fully 
compliant
Ease of agreement: very 
difficult–easy
Interaction Impact on other current accounting —
consequences interactions
Impact on future accounting periods
Impact on fee negotiations
Impact on quality of primary relationship
Impact on third parties
Source: Adapted from Tables 12.1 to 12.11, in Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About, Beattie
et al. (2001), Palgrave. Reproduced with permission.
12 V. Beattie et al.
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The primary contextual factors affecting the
strategy adopted and the nature of the outcome
appeared to be general to the case, rather than
specific to the interaction. In particular, the
integrity of the AEP influenced the quality of the
outcome – high integrity ensured an outcome
quality above a certain threshold, although the
ease of agreement depended upon other factors.
The quality of the primary relationship impacted
directly upon both the quality of the outcome and
(in those cases where the position of the FD was in
tune with that of the board) the ease of agreement.
Where the position of the FD was not in tune with
that of the board, difficult interactions could still
arise despite a good primary relationship.
The integrity of the AEP and the quality of the
primary relationship appeared to be correlated, in
practice, insofar as all of the good or very good
primary relationships involved AEPs with high
integrity. Other general contextual factors that
critically influenced both outcome characteristics
were: the company type and situation (e.g.,
conservative or aggressive, the possibility of a 
bid); the effectiveness of corporate governance
arrangements in the company (e.g., powerful,
dominant chairman); the clarity of the accounting
rules relating to the interaction issue; and the
support and quality control procedures of the 
audit firm. These relationships are shown in 
Figure 2.
It was also observed that some contextual factors
served to constrain the possible outcome to within
certain bounds (e.g., AEP integrity), while others
acted more as moderating variables (e.g., quality of
14 V. Beattie et al.
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Level of integrity
of AEP 
Company type and 
situation 
Effectiveness of
corporate 
governance
Clarity of accounting 
rules on issue 
Level of audit firm
support and quality
control 
Good – poor/not
compliant
Quality of primary
relationship 
Easy – very
difficult
Holds only where 
reporting styles of
FD and board in
accord
Contextual factors Outcome characteristics
Figure 2: Relationships between Contextual Factors and Outcome Characteristics
Source: Figure 12.3, in Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About, Beattie et al. (2001), Palgrave.
Reproduced with permission.
company’s corporate governance arrangements).
The strategy adopted by, in particular, the AEP, 
was an intervening variable in these relationships.
In general, assertiveness, reasoning, coalition and
sanction strategies were associated with good
outcomes, although whether they were attained
easily or not depended on other contextual 
factors. By contrast, ingratiation and conditional
acceptance were associated with poor outcomes.
The use of bargaining and authority strategies
were associated with outcomes of varying quality
and so no stable relationships emerged.
Six interactions had outcomes that were, to
varying degrees, difficult to achieve, irrespective of
the quality of the outcome. The cases involved had
certain characteristics in common: two were small,
family-controlled companies where the chairman
was a grudger, while two involved hostile bids
(with a third considering a sale). Notably, they also
had one critical characteristic not in common, as a
mix of relationship qualities was represented –
from poor to very good. However, in those cases
where the relationship was at least good, the FD
and the board were not in harmony in their
reporting style, and it was this that contributed to
the difficulty.
Four interactions had outcomes that were of low
quality (either poor or creative compliance). Both
cases giving rise to these four interactions involved
AEPs who exhibited moderate rather than high
levels of integrity and where the primary
relationship was less than good. In none of these
four interactions did the AEP state their position
firmly, and the failure to use this assertiveness
strategy seems to have contributed significantly to
the poor outcomes.
Seller types
A secondary outcome of the study was the
identification of a hierarchy of six seller (i.e. AEP)
types to complement the taxonomy of buyer types
that already exists in the literature. ‘Crusaders’, 
the highest quality AEP, exhibit an extremely 
high level of professional and personal integrity. 
In other words, they display a social conscience as
well as a professional conscience. They are
prepared to take their responsibilities beyond their
strict statutory duty if they feel that it is the right
thing to do. The ‘safe pair of hands’ AEP displays
a high level of professional integrity and their
actions are designed to ensure that the company’s
financial reporting complies not only with the
letter of the regulatory framework, but with the
spirit. Although this seller type identifies strongly
with the client company, and acts as advisors to it,
they do not compromise themselves in any way.
‘Accommodators’ have a moderate level of
professional integrity, complying with the letter 
of the rules. However they are prepared, under
certain circumstances, to bend the rules, that is, to
condone creative compliance or rather aggressive
accounting treatments. The circumstances might
be pressure from the client company, or historical
‘baggage’ relating to the issue that make it difficult
to insist on what is known to be the ‘right’
accounting outcome. Above all else, they want 
to be helpful to the company where possible. 
This approach can, however, easily backfire if the
client company loses respect for the AEP. ‘Trusters’,
when dealing with a client company that is 
known to have a conservative reporting style 
and to be concerned to preserve its reputation,
adopt an attitude that is insufficiently critical and
questioning given their role as auditor. They 
take the company to be fireproof and are not
sufficiently sceptical. While their underlying
professional integrity may be high, this trusting
attitude serves to ‘dilute’ their effective level of
professional integrity.
Both the accommodator and the truster can
exhibit ‘do-it-yourself’ characteristics, in that they
do not consult appropriately within their firm. This
behaviour could arise for a number of reasons: it
may be that the AEP thinks that they know it all,
or that they are doing something that they know
they should not be doing, or because of personal
style. Both the crusader and the safe pair of hands
do, however, consult when appropriate.9
‘Incompetents’ lack the necessary level of
technical competence to secure good outcomes in
cases where the client company is ignorant or non-
compliant. ‘Rogues’ have no sense of professional
integrity. They will knowingly flout the regulatory
framework for personal gain if they think that they
can get away with it.10 No examples of the lowest
two quality levels were found among the case
studies in the present study.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study reported here shows audit to be a
complex, interactive and judgemental process,
which requires a high level of technical knowledge,
integrity and interpersonal skills from the AEP. 
The outcome of each interaction is found to be
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004 Int. J. Audit. 8: 1–19 (2004)
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influenced by a range of factors that emanate from
the general circumstances of each case, the specific
nature and significance of the issue and the clarity
of the regulatory framework surrounding it.
The grounded theory model of auditor-client
interactions presented in this paper suggests that
existing negotiation models (e.g., Gulliver, 1979
and Nicotera, 1993) do not adequately encompass
all dimensions of these interactions. The quality of
the primary relationship and the integrity of the
AEP are shown to be critical in securing a good
(i.e., high quality) outcome. A quality hierarchy of
six seller types is hypothesised. Fully compliant
outcomes are easier to achieve where the company
board has a conservative attitude to financial
reporting and where there is a good working
relationship between the FD and the AEP. A
key driver of aggressive accounting was found 
to be financial difficulty, and particularly the 
need to stay within debt covenants. Financial
reporting quality could change rapidly as a
company’s circumstances change (e.g., a decline in
profitability or the expectation of a hostile bid).
Good relationships occurred where there was
mutual trust and respect and where both parties
had a high level of integrity.
Fully compliant outcomes were more difficult 
to achieve where one or more of the following
circumstances existed: the board’s culture was less
conservative; the issue was a sensitive one within
the company; the issue arose at a late stage in the
financial reporting cycle; the buyer type was a
grudger; or the firm was disorganised. To achieve
a fully compliant outcome in these more difficult
circumstances, the AEP needed to take a firm
position from the outset. Additional useful
strategies were for the AEP to call on other parties
in his firm for support and also seek support 
from the company’s audit committee. Support
from the audit committee was not, however,
necessarily forthcoming. A well-researched
argument grounded in the regulations greatly
helped the AEP to carry his point. Where the issue
was a matter of judgement rather than a
straightforward matter of compliance with a
regulation, the AEP found it more difficult to get
his point of view accepted. An important
mechanism for avoiding confrontation was for the
FD and the AEP to maintain a continuous,
interactive relationship, so that issues were
resolved as they arose. Late interventions from an
audit firm’s technical reviews caused irritation to
FDs. Proposed last minute adjustments to accounts
created undue time pressure and had the potential
to lead AEPs to compromise the outcomes.
The four low quality outcomes arose in cases
where the relationship between the FD and the
AEP (i.e., the primary relationship) was not good.
Poor relationships may arise because the FD and
AEP do not trust and respect each other and 
lack goal congruence. Contributory factors to this
situation occur where the FD has previously been
in a position senior to the AEP in the same audit
firm (which appears to put the AEP at a
disadvantage) or where there is a significant age
and experience gap between them.
Non-compliance with accounting standards that
is visible on the face of the accounts appeared to be
extremely rare, since companies and auditors run
the risk of visible breaches being picked up by
FRRP. The FRRP is perceived as a deterrent to 
non-compliance, particularly by the larger, more
conservative companies who do not wish to incur
reputation damage. Ownership structure and
corporate culture were found to have a major
influence on attitudes to corporate governance and
financial reporting.
There was strong awareness among FDs and
AEPs of the possibility of sanctions being applied.
The key sanction available to a company board 
is to remove an auditor, subject to legal process.
This puts economic pressure on the audit partner.
Another form of economic pressure is to try and
get the audit fees reduced. The threat of putting the
audit out to tender (made in two of the cases) is
normally the first step in the auditor change
process and can be used either for the purpose of
intimidating an auditor and/or as a means of
getting a fee reduction.
The key sanction available to an auditor is to
qualify the audit report (or, in extremis, to resign
and draw attention to the reasons for the
resignation). However, lack of regulatory clarity
and materiality can render this sanction ineffective.
Lesser sanctions, such as referring the matter to the
audit committee and/or the main board, are not
always effective – these groups may choose to
support the FD.
All the audit firms in the six cases had in-house
quality control procedures in place, such as
technical departments, consultation procedures
and second partners assigned to the clients.
However, the extent and timeliness of the use of
these resources appeared to lie in the hands of the
AEPs. Critically, the ones who most needed to
consult appeared to be the least inclined to do so.
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The findings of this study suggest several useful
avenues for future research. Further work is
required to verify (and develop) the grounded
theory model presented here. This could involve
further case studies, particularly in other
jurisdictions where some of the general contextual
factors will be different. In addition, it would be
useful to conduct experimental studies that focus
on subsets of the critical variables to emerge from
the grounded theory. Examining the attitudes,
beliefs and motivations of secondary parties to the
interaction could also extend the model presented
here.
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NOTES
1. McBarnet & Whelan (1991, 1992) argue that 
a strategy of anti-formalism was adopted by
the newly formed Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB) post-Dearing in an explicit bid 
to restrain creative accounting. There has,
however, been a drift (or push) back to
formalism throughout the 1990s in the UK,
with many accounting standards now
including detailed guidance notes in addition
to the broad principles (e.g., FRS 15).
2. To support the accuracy of the interviewee’s
statements, reference was made to the
company’s annual reports where the outcomes
of some of the discussions and negotiations
were observable, thus providing assurance
about the reliability of the evidence collected
(Yin, 1984, p. 80).
3. Without the client’s permission, no AEP
would talk to us because of professional
confidentiality rules.
4. In particular, there is the regulatory
environment in which the negotiation takes
place, together with the professional
connections of the main participants.
5. As confidentiality assurances had been given
to the interviewees, certain distinguishing
features about the companies have been
omitted and changes made to information
provided about the company and its activities
in order to protect its identity. The omissions
and changes do not alter the substance of 
the stories. Changes necessitated by ethical
considerations such as these have been made
in other accounting research projects (e.g.,
Anderson-Gough et al., 1999, p. 47).
6. In the cases where a continuing business
relationship still existed between the two
parties, particular care was taken to ensure that
each party was comfortable with the remarks
about his peer being included in the story.
Although the companies themselves would
not be identifiable, we were conscious that the
interviewees could recognise each other, and
we have no wish to undermine any business
relationship. Other than very minor edits to
improve clarity, which were suggested by the
interviewees themselves, no other changes
have been made to the material taken from the
original transcripts.
7. Because of confidentiality constraints we
referred to company size as being merely
larger or smaller. For the same reason, the 
size of the audit firm was not disclosed. The
existence of an audit committee was either yes
or no, but attached to yes was an indicator as
to whether it was (or was perceived to be)
effective.
8. This figure is a useful analytical aid for
considering the wide range of conditions and,
to a lesser extent, consequences related to the
phenomenon under study. Strauss & Corbin
(1990, ch. 10) refer to it as a ‘conditional
matrix’.
9. It should also be noted that not all of the seller
types are mutually exclusive. In particular, 
it would be possible for an AEP to display
accommodator and truster characteristics.
10. The well-publicised US case of ESM provides
an example of this AEP type (Wall Street
Journal, 1987). The engagement partner stated
that the loss of status within the partnership,
were he to lose the client, was one of the
reasons that he acquiesced to the client’s
fraudulent accounting practices.
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